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The key finding is that the adjustment will be particularly difficult for Greece (and Portugal) 
because these are two relatively closed economies with low savings rates. Both of these 
countries are facing a solvency problem because they combine high debt levels with low 
growth and high interest rates. Fiscal and external adjustment is thus required for 
sustainability, not just to satisfy the Stability Pact. By contrast, Ireland and Spain face more of 
a liquidity than a solvency problem. Italy seems to have a much better starting position on all 
accounts. 
Fiscal adjustment alone will not be sufficient to ensure sustainability. Without significant 
reductions in labour costs, these economies will face years of stagnation at best. Especially in 
the case of Greece, it is imperative that the cuts in public sector wages are transmitted to the 
entire economy in order to restore competitiveness, and thus ensure that export growth can 
become a vital safety valve. 
Without an adjustment of wages in the private sector, the adjustment will become so difficult 
that failure cannot be excluded. 
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ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES 
IN THE GIPSY CLUB 
CEPS WORKING DOCUMENT NO. 326/MARCH 2010 
DANIEL GROS* 
Strategic background 
The general post-crisis background in Europe today is not too different from the busts that have 
followed other credit booms. The key characteristic of a boom is the expansion of leverage (i.e. 
private debt).1 The key characteristic of the subsequent bust is the explosion of public debt as 
private debt cannot be serviced. The economies of Ireland and Latvia (and to some extent Spain) 
offer good examples of this trend: in both countries public debt was not an issue prior to the 
crisis (then only about 25% of GDP in Ireland and close to zero in Latvia). The crisis has 
changed this radically: by 2011 public debt in Ireland is expected to reach 95% of GDP and 
60% of GDP in Latvia.  
Within the euro area, however, it is no longer possible to make such a clear distinction between 
public and private debt given that no euro area country has access to the printing press (which is 
the element that makes government debt risk free in nominal terms in countries with their own 
currency). The cases of Greece and Portugal illustrate this point. Their governments borrowed 
heavily on international capital markets to finance unsustainable consumption booms. The 
public debt of the peripheral euro area countries has thus more of the characteristics of private 
debt in the general case. Only the public debt of the core countries with solid public finances 
(essentially Germany) remains public debt in the sense in which the term is usually used, 
namely the one kind of debt that is riskless. 
What is thus happening in the euro area is the age-old process whereby creditors put pressure 
upon the strongest debtors (the euro area core governments) to support the weaker debtors 
(banks, euro peripheral countries). If history serves as any guide, this pressure will prevail 
because the alternative is perceived to be a potentially disruptive breakdown in markets and 
hence further delay in the recovery. 
In this sense, Europe seems destined to repeat the classic bust scenario in which private debt 
becomes public debt of the core countries. However, the willingness and ability of the core 
countries to accept this burden have their limits. Hence one needs to prepare for the second 
stage of crisis, namely an increased danger of sovereign default. This danger is likely to persist 
for some time. The perceived need to take immediate action on the particular case of Greece 
should not constitute an excuse not to act on this longer-term strategic problem. Moreover, there 
are a number of other countries that are often thought to be in a similar situation and are thus 
sometimes lumped together under the heading ‘PIGS’ (for Portugal, Ireland, Greece and Spain) 
or the variation ‘GIPSY’ (for Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and ItalY). 
Whether referred to as members of the GIPSY club or PIGS, however, these economies in 
reality are quite heterogeneous. Nevertheless, since the markets sometimes lump them together 
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(at least the first four members), this paper provides data in general for all five members. 
Portugal and Greece share a key feature, namely an extremely low rate of national savings, 
which implies that they have to rely continuously on large inflows of capital to finance 
consumption.2 By contrast, Ireland and Spain have much higher savings rates, but are more 
exposed to financial markets because their construction booms went hand in hand with a huge 
expansion of financial activity. In short, for Greece and Portugal the problem is insolvency; for 
Spain and Ireland illiquidity. Italy seems different from both these subgroups in that its savings 
rate is higher than even in Ireland and Spain and its foreign imbalances are much smaller. With 
a rather conservative financial sector, it should be able to weather the storm quite well. 
Key obstacles for a successful adjustment 
The reminder of this note analyses three aspects that will determine the adjustment process in 
Greece and the other Southern euro area member countries. A first aspect is the impact of the 
fiscal adjustment on demand and hence output, which leads to lower tax revenues, thus 
potentially creating a vicious circle. Section 2 deals with another aspect which will come to the 
forefront over time, namely the impact of the higher risk premia on investment and consumption 
in Greece and other countries affected by the crisis. Are these premia justified? Given the 
current combinations of high-risk premia, low growth and very high external debt levels, 
Section 3 shows that the doubts about the sustainability of the external position of Greece and 
Portugal are justified. 
The case of Argentina is also referred to in parallel because the way in which this country slid 
slowly towards default is very instructive: it shows the economic/political mechanisms that 
produced a disaster. Argentina thus provides a cautionary tale of what can go wrong (see box 
below).  
Box 1. The Argentine debt saga 
By 1998, Argentina appeared to constitute a success story. The tight 1:1 link of the peso to the 
USD had apparently brought stability. Growth had rebounded strongly after the ‘Tequila’ crisis 
of 1995, averaging over 6% for three years. Fiscal policy was at first sight3 well behaved with a 
deficit around, but usually below 3% of GDP. A current account deficit had developed, but at 3-
4% of GDP it seemed manageable, especially since it was entirely covered by FDI (thus not 
creating any debt). However, starting around 1998 this honeymoon period came to an end as the 
Federal Reserve increased interest rates and risk aversion in international financial markets 
increased with the Russian debt crisis. Between 1998 and 2000 Argentina entered a period of a 
crisis which worsened over time as a vicious circle developed between increases in the risk 
premium, the need for stronger fiscal adjustment and a deteriorating growth outlook. Three IMF 
programmes failed to break this circle although they were designed to exactly achieve this and 
could not stave off the eventual default at the end of 2000 (see Gros &.Mayer, 2010). In the two 
years leading to the default, real GDP fell by about 4%.  
1)  On the feasibility of a huge fiscal adjustment 
The problem facing Greece could be described as the need for a very large fiscal adjustment 
without a safety valve. Several factors explain why it will be difficult: 
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1.  The pure Keynesian multiplier is likely to be high (because the savings rate is low, as also is 
the degree of trade openness). 
2.  The low degree of trade openness means that higher exports cannot provide a strong offset 
to lower domestic demand. 
3.  The elevated risk premium on external debt is being transmitted to the entire domestic 
economy, thus providing an additional shock equivalent to an interest rate increase of about 
300 bps. 
Portugal has in most respects very similar characteristics, but in a somewhat attenuated form 
(somewhat higher degree of openness, slightly less dependence on foreign capital). 
A first benchmark for the cost of the fiscal adjustment in terms of output fall can be obtained 
using the standard fiscal multiplier. To keep things simple, we follow the simplest Keynesian 
macro model imaginable: an open economy, where exports are determined by foreign demand 
(and hence exogenous in the short run) and imports vary proportionally with domestic income. 
Table 1. Simplistic Keynesian multipliers 
Country  Keynesian multiplier: 
1/(1-c+m)=1/(s+m) 
Excess deficit 
(actual 2009 – 3%) 
Impact of fiscal 
adjustment on output 
relative to baseline, in % 
Greece 2.5  9.7  -24.6 
Italy 1.5  2.2  -3.4 
Spain 2.0  8.2  -16.5 
Portugal 1.7  5.0  -8.2 
Germany 0.64  0.4  -0.2 
Ireland 1.3  9.5  -12.6 
Note: The marginal savings rate, s, is computed as the ratio of the increment in private savings relative to the 
increment in GDP over the period 2002-07; similarly the marginal propensity to import, m, is computed as the 
ratio of the increment in imports relative to the increment in GDP over the same period. 
Source: AMECO. 
The impact of the fiscal adjustment on output in all countries in the GIPSY club, except Italy, is 
clearly so large as to be politically unfeasible. This judgment would not change even if one 
takes into account that the adjustment would be stretched over a number of years (three in the 
case of Greece) and that one should adjust the numbers in the last column for the cumulative 
effect of trend growth over this period. For Greece, even assuming a trend growth rate of 3% 
per annum, the overall predicted fall in GDP would still be around 15%. 
In the standard approach of assessing the effect of fiscal stimuli, large multipliers are seen as 
‘magnifiers’ of fiscal policy measures and are therefore welcome. However, large multipliers 
also imply that the effect of fiscal cuts is going to be larger. Greece exhibits the largest 
multiplier as it is the country with the lowest level of savings rate (12% on average, compared to 
24% in Germany), while Ireland is the country with the smallest. The latter is largely driven by 
the very high level of imports-to-GDP ratio rather than a high propensity to save.  
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In the last column of Table 1, Greece stands out as the country with the largest impact of the 
fiscal adjustment on GDP, resulting from a combination of the largest multiplier and largest 
adjustment need. Ireland has a similar fiscal adjustment need, but the impact on output should 
be somewhat smaller (‘only’ about 13%) given that it is a much more open economy. The 
simplistic multipliers used here exaggerate the severity of the recession that would follow the 
fiscal adjustment required by a strict adherence to the Maastricht criteria, but they imply that the 
official EU convergence programme for Greece of February 2010, which is based on the 
assumption that GDP growth will be positive during the entire adjustment period, is not 
realistic. 
Overall Table 1 suggests that the fiscal adjustment required in the GIPSY group would have 
such a large negative impact on output that it might well be politically impossible. This might 
be the reason why financial markets continue to harbour doubts about the sustainability of 
public finances of these countries.5 
2)  Reliance on foreign capital and the impact of higher risk premia 
The impact of the increasing sovereign risk premium is not likely to remain limited to the cost 
of public debt, but it will affect the cost of capital for the private sector as well.  
There are several dimensions to take into account,6 but the key element is simply the resource 
constraint for the entire economy. If the government tries to achieve a deficit reduction by 
cutting transfer spending or increasing taxes, households and enterprises have to cut back either 
consumption and investment (illustrating the Keynesian effect discussed above) or they can try 
to borrow more. However, in this case they will have to borrow abroad since domestic savings 
are not sufficient. Moreover, households would have to go through the domestic banking 
system, which might not be able to extend further credit because its capital base has been 
weakened by substantial mark to market losses on its holdings of government debt. Moreover, 
for international financial markets the rating (and thus risk premium) of the sovereign is usually 
the benchmark applied to private-sector entities of that country. This implies that Greek banks 
or large companies are likely to have to pay an even higher risk premium. Hence the increase in 
the cost of capital for the government is likely to be transmitted to the entire economy with a 
further negative impact on investment and consumption demand.  
How important is foreign capital for the GIPSY group? Figure 1 shows the ratio of the current 
account balance to the total amount of savings available for the economy, namely the sum of 
(gross) national savings plus the current account. This measure of the reliance of the country on 
foreign capital places Greece again in the most delicate position as it is the country that depends 
                                                      
5 Greece suffers from twin deficits: a large fiscal deficit and an equally large current account deficit.  
Sustainability requires dealing with both, but this would require a change in the behaviour of the private 
sector, which cannot be controlled by the Government. Annex B shows that under the assumption that 
import behaviour stays unchanged and no improvement in competition materialises, the fall in GDP 
induced by fiscal austerity will reduce imports but may be not sufficient to eliminate the present deficit.   
6 According to the textbook approach, in an economy where government debt is held by residents and the 
Ricardian equivalence does not hold, an increase in the return on government bonds (which are wealth for 
households) results in higher consumption, regardless of the reasons of the increase. On the contrary in a 
Ricardian economy, because the expectation of higher future taxes is discounted immediately, no effect 
on the consumption should be observed. However, reality differs in one crucial aspect from the 
assumptions in textbooks: Greek public debt is held mainly by foreigners. Hence, the entire discussion 
about Ricardian equivalence is beside the point for countries such as Greece and Portugal where the 
government deficit was financed by capital inflows. ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 5 
 
the most on foreign borrowing. The increase in the risk premium on Greek government debt is 
thus likely to permeate throughout the entire economy.  
Figure 1. Reliance on foreign capital 
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Source: AMECO and own calculations. 
3)  Are risk premia justified? Threats to external and internal 
sustainability as boom turns to bust 
How to assess the sustainability of the external debt position of a euro area member?  
A first point is that ratios to GDP provide little information on sustainability because external 
debt has to be serviced via exports (and tax revenues if public). The following table therefore 
shows three indicators of the sustainability of external debt for Greece and some members of the 
GIPSY club (as of 2008) as well as Argentina (1999). 
Table 2. Gross foreign debt 
   Gross foreign debt (2008) 
   % GDP  % Exports  % Tax revenue 
Greece 147  659  422 
Portugal 215  635  570 
Spain 156  581  471 
Italy 117  406  273 
Pro memoria: Argentina (1999)  52  529  658 
Sources: IFS, AMECO, WEO and own calculations. 
In the short run, gross debt is the decisive variable because this is the amount that has to be 
serviced and refinanced (often at much higher rates). 6 | DANIEL GROS 
 
It is apparent that on the first, standard, indicator, Greece and Portugal appear to be in a much 
worse situation than even Argentina since their debt-to-GDP ratios (between 150 and above 
200% of GDP) are much higher than that of Argentina in 1999, two years before it defaulted. 
One could argue that net debt might be the more important concept in the longer run. On this 
account, as shown in Table 3, the indebtedness of most countries appears to be much smaller.  
Table 3. Net foreign debt 
   Net foreign debt (2008) 
   % GDP  % Exports  % Tax revenue 
Greece 69  312  200 
Portugal 77  228  204 
Spain 74  276  224 
Italy 28  96  65 
Pro memoria: Argentina (1999)  0.3  2  80 
Sources: Idem 
However, one should keep in mind that Argentina had very little net external debt prior to its 
crisis (see Table 3). This is not surprising given that Argentina had not run large current account 
deficits prior to the crisis (deficits of the size observed within the euro area would anyway not 
have been financed by international capital markets). However, its government had borrowed 
heavily from international capital markets whereas its citizens had preferred to send their money 
abroad rather than paying taxes at home. Argentina defaulted because the government was not 
able to tax the wealth its citizens had squirreled abroad. The Greek government might find itself 
soon in a very similar position. This is why the gross debt figures are the more relevant ones in a 
time of crisis. 
It is often remarked that until recently financial markets seemed to provide Greece with ample 
financing, although its current account deficits and the approximate size of its public debt were 
well known. However, this was during a period when Greek GDP was growing in nominal 
terms by over 7% and nominal (long-term) interest rates were between 3.5 and 4%. With the 
nominal growth rate 3 percentage points higher than the interest rate, sustainability was not an 
issue. However, the situation has how changed radically. The interest rates paid by the Greek 
government and also its private sector, as illustrated below, have gone up to over 6% due to the 
increase in the risk premium on Greek sovereign bonds while nominal growth rates going 
forward have plummeted to below 2% p.a.. Table 4 below shows the growth rates expected by 
the European Commission up to 2011.  
Table 4. The evolution of a key factor for sustainability: Growth rates of nominal GDP 
  Annual average values 
  2003-07 2009-11 
Difference 
boom to bust 
Ireland 7.5  -2.9  -10.4 
Greece 7.4  1.5  -5.9 
Spain 7.3 -0.6 -7.9 
Italy 3.5  1.1  -2.5 
Portugal 3.7  0.4  -3.3 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 7 
 
In Greece the growth rate of nominal GDP has fallen by about 6 percentage points (from 7.4% 
p.a. before the crisis to 1.5% p.a. now). Given that nominal risk-free interest rates have not 
changed much, but the risk premium has increased by over 3 percentage points this implies that 
the differential between the growth rate and the interest rate has deteriorated by over 9 
percentage points, from almost plus 4% to below minus 5%. Here again Greece seems in a 
worse situation than most other members of the GIPSY club.  
Sustainability of public finances requires that the primary deficit is large enough to offset the 
so-called ‘snowball effect’. In this respect, the situation has changed radically. During the boom 
phase, i.e. until 2007 the growth rate of nominal GDP was for Greece at 7.4 more than 3 
percentage points higher than the cost of public debt (around 4.1% on 10-year government 
bonds during that period). The government could thus run a primary deficit of 3-4% of GDP and 
still keep the debt-to-GDP ratio constant.7 However, with the bust came much lower growth 
prospects after the crisis and a much higher risk premium. Greece is now paying 6-6.5% on this 
government debt, about 5 full percentage points more than nominal GDP growth, which is now 
expected to be only 1.5%, as shown in Table 4. This implies that Greece now needs to have a 
primary surplus of 6% of GDP just to keep the debt-to-GDP ratio from increasing even further. 
The total swing in the primary balance required just to maintain sustainability is thus about 10% 
of GDP. The adjustment required by the EU is therefore not needed merely to satisfy the 
parameters of the Stability Pact, but they are necessary in any event to put Greek public on a 
sustainable path. 
Table 5. Primary balance adjustment required to offset snowball effect  
    Snow ball effect 
 Debt/GDP  (2009) 
Boom: 
2003-07 
Bust: 
2009-11 
Difference Boom to Bust 
Primary balance adjustment required to 
offset snowball effect (% GDP) 
Ireland 0.6  2.2  -5.3  7.4 
Greece 1.2  3.9  -6.0  9.9 
Spain 0.5 1.7  -2.3  4.0 
Italy 1.13  -0.7  -3.6  2.9 
Portugal 0.75  -0.2  -3.3  3.1 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. 
The overall adjustment in the primary balance required to offset the deteriorating snowball 
effect is shown for all the countries in question in Figure 2. 
Another important factor impinging on sustainability which is not pursued here is the question 
of whether the build-up of debt was used to finance investment or consumption.  
In the case of Greece and Portugal, it was mainly consumption, as can be seen from their low 
national savings rates.  
 
                                                      
7 The exact level of this ratio is difficult to pin down given the repeated massaging of the figures, but this 
does not matter in this context. 8 | DANIEL GROS 
 
Figure 2. Boom to bust: Change in primary fiscal balance required to keep debt ratios from 
increasing 
 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. 
Indeed, as Figure 3 shows, the net national savings rate of Greece and Portugal were 
substantially in negative territory and the gross savings rates in single digits, while the other 
members of the GIPSY group have positive net savings rates and much higher gross rates as 
well. The external deficits of Portugal and Greece were thus not due to particularly high 
investment rates (as in Spain and Ireland), but due to the fact that the increase in consumption 
over the last decade could not be financed out of current production. 
Figure 3. Net and gross national savings as % of GDP in 2007 
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Source: AMECO 
How would Greek households finance their consumption boom? Partially at least from an 
extraordinary increase in public sector social expenditure, which doubled in nominal euro terms 
since the introduction of the euro, bringing the share of social expenditure from 20% of GDP in 
1999 to close to 30% in 2007. By contrast, as shown in Figure 4, public sector social ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 9 
 
expenditure in Germany has always been higher, but was on a declining path since the reforms 
started in 2003.8  
Figure 4. Social expenditure as % of GDP 
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Source: AMECO. 
In the cases of Spain and Ireland, both of which have much higher national savings rates than 
Greece, the foreign debt financed mainly an excess of housing investment.9 
The factors discussed here have nothing to do with the often-heard view that in a monetary area 
“current accounts do not matter”. It is clear that within the euro area the current account of 
member countries does not matter in the classic sense. However, the current account still 
expresses the mismatch between savings and investment. Short-term deviations from the 
equilibrium between these two macroeconomic variables have indeed no significance in a 
monetary union. Yet sustained current account deficits lead to a build-up of debt, which might 
become unsustainable. 
Given the dependency on foreign capital for many members of the GIPSY club, a fiscal 
adjustment alone is not sufficient. Foreign capital has become scarcer also because financial 
markets recognise that it is not only the internal fiscal position of the government that has 
become untenable as the boom has turned into a bust. The same applies also the external 
position of the country as a whole. The key for external sustainability is the difference between 
the interest paid on foreign debt and the growth rate of exports. As usual, the situation appeared 
quite comfortable during the boom, when exports were growing at a rate even slightly higher 
than GDP (and interest rates were low). However, the constellation has now reversed: export 
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more recently.  
9 See Gros (2010). 10 | DANIEL GROS 
 
growth is likely to remain anaemic since the major export market is the eurozone whose growth 
prospects are not encouraging.    
Box.2. Compensation of employees and adjustments 
Public sector wages are currently among the most (un)popular target of the adjustment 
programmes throughout Southern Europe, and particularly in Greece. According to a 
widespread perception, the cost of government employment should be the root cause for the 
increase in public expenditure and thus the deficits. However, closer inspection of the data 
does not corroborate this view. In particular in the case of Greece, the cost of public sector 
employment (measured by the total compensation of public employees) absorbed ‘only’ 
11.2% of GDP in 2007, not much higher than in 2000, and not far from the euro area average 
(see the table below.) In this respect Portugal does much worse. Within the euro area, 
Germany and Portugal thus constitute the two outliers. The former registers the lowest score 
and a declining trend, whereas in the latter (Portugal) compensation of employees constitutes 
almost 13% of GDP.  
A key conclusion from these numbers is, however, that compressing the cost of public sector 
employment can only constitute a fraction of the overall fiscal adjustment. Starting from 
about 11% of GDP, even a massive cut would yield savings worth 2.2% of GDP. This is less 
than a quarter of the total adjustment of 10 percentage points of GDP required by Greece. 
This is not surprising since compensation of public sector employees constitutes less than a 
quarter of total government expenditure almost everywhere. Of course, in the case of 
Portugal, the contribution from cutting public sector wages could be much higher.  
 
Source: AMECO. 
Table 6 shows by how much the trade balance would have to adjust to maintain external debt 
constant (and thus at the very high level as shown above).10 Here again Greece stands out as 
                                                      
10 The details for these calculations are provided in Annex B; one has to take into account the fact that the 
risk premium increases overall foreign debt service costs, but not the returns received on holdings of 
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having the largest adjustment need at around 7.5% of GDP. Ceteris paribus, this would require 
a huge compression of domestic demand.  
Table 6. The external adjustment required as boom turns to bust   
Hp: Fall in export growth rate (Δet) =4% 
  
Risk premium 
(π) 
Adjustment in trade balance-
to-GDP: Δ(TBt/Yt) required 
for sustainability 
Greece 3  7.5 
Portugal 0.5  4 
Spain 1.3  6 
Italy 0.8  2 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data. 
This analysis of the requirements for internal (fiscal) and external debt sustainability suggests a 
very large fall in output is unavoidable unless exports can be boosted via a substantial internal 
devaluation (i.e. a cut in nominal wages throughout the economy).  
This section has put the emphasis on the fact that deficits that were sustainable during a boom 
have to turn into surpluses as growth prospects deteriorate and risk premia increase. However, 
in some of the countries, fiscal policies are so expansionary that they would not be sustainable 
even during a boom. The adjustment required from the present positions is thus even larger as 
Table 7 below shows. Comparing the figures in this table to those in Table 1 above shows that 
the adjustment needed to ensure sustainability is rather close to the adjustment that is needed to 
satisfy the Stability Pact.11 
 
Table 7. The actual fiscal adjustment needs 
  
Actual (2009) 
primary balance % 
of GDP 
Primary surplus (% 
of GDP) required 
for sustainability 
Adjustment 
required for 
sustainability 
Ireland -10.2  2.6 12.8 
Greece -7.7  5.9 13.6 
Spain -9.4  1.2 10.6 
Italy -0.5  3.1 3.6 
Portugal -5  2.4 7.4 
Note: Primary surplus required for sustainability is derived from the equation. (B3) in Appendix B.  
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO data.  
 
A similar reasoning applies to the external debt situation. Table 8 shows the adjustment required 
in the trade balance to move from the current position to a sustainable path. According to the 
table, Italy is the country closest to sustainability.12 The largest adjustment required can be 
                                                      
11 See Economic Forecast Autumn 2009 for a description of the unsustainable path of Government debt, 
in the euro area members, under the hypothesis of no fiscal adjustment. 
12 We omit the case of Ireland for which the data on gross external debt are difficult to interpret since 
they comprise the debt of local subsidiaries owned 100% by foreign financial and other corporations. The 
computation of the trade surplus required for sustainability in Ireland (based on formula B3 in Appendix 
B) would be unduly affected by this phenomenon (which does not really represent foreign debt).   12 | DANIEL GROS 
 
observed again for Greece and Portugal. This implies that in order to reach a sustainable 
external position, both countries will either have to reduce their consumption of foreign goods 
equivalent to 10% of GDP or experience an export boom. Since the latter is rather unlikely in 
the short run, it seems that a substantial compression in domestic demand is unavoidable before 
external equilibrium can be reached. A sustainable external position is also a pre-condition for 
lower risk premia on international financial markets. It is thus likely that these risk premia will 
not fall substantially as long as the external deficits continue at their present unsustainable scale. 
Table 8. The actual external adjustment needs 
  
Actual trade 
balance (% of 
GDP) 
Trade surplus (% 
of GDP) required 
for sustainability 
Adjustment 
required for 
sustainability 
Greece  -4.9 5.2  10.0 
Spain  -1.5 3.0  4.5 
Italy  -0.3 1.2  1.5 
Portugal  -7.6 2.3  9.9 
Note: The trade balance compatible with sustainable debt is derived from eq. (B3) in Appendix B. It is 
calculated based on the assumption that the export growth rate is the same for all countries and equal to 
1.5% (market growth as predicted by Commission services). 
Source: Own calculations based on AMECO and IFS data. 
Concluding remarks 
Greece represents the first test for adjustment in the eurozone. Unfortunately, it is likely to 
represent a particularly difficult case because of a combination of factors which distinguish the 
Greek economy: high debt ratios, a low degree of openness and a continuing high dependency 
on external financing. 
It seems unavoidable that any fiscal adjustment of the order of magnitude demanded by the EU 
(and promised by the Greek government) is likely to lead to deep recession and social unrest. 
The inescapable reality is that a ‘sudden stop’ of capital inflows requires ultimately a sharp 
compression of consumption (investment is already low). But this takes time! 
The main danger facing Europe right now is not so much the sudden emergence of a crisis in the 
spring of 2010, but rather a slowly developing vicious circle, which over time saps the 
willingness of the Greek political system to pursue the adjustment effort they signed up to. 
What can Greece do to escape the ‘Argentine’ vicious circle of higher risk premia and a 
worsening economic outlook? 
The only way to minimise the cost of the external and fiscal adjustments that are required to 
make the situation sustainable is to make Greece more competitive and thus stimulate exports. 
This can be achieved only by an across-the-board reduction of wages (or rather labour costs) in 
the private sector of between 10 and 20%. Cuts in wages of this order of magnitude will 
encounter fierce popular resistance. They could come about either at the end of an extremely 
painful process when unemployment has reached peaks never seen before or they could come 
much earlier as the result of an overarching national agreement in which the government, 
opposition parties and the social partners agree on what is needed in the light of present 
circumstances. Greece thus needs a concerted effort at the national level not just a government 
that pushes austerity measures through Parliament.  ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 13 
 
The reduction in labour costs required to re-establish an external balance is probably higher for 
Greece than for other countries precisely because the economy is relatively closed. But the more 
time that is lost in dealing with this root cause, the more difficult the adjustment will become. 
Europe, or rather the EU, however, needs to prepare itself for the eventuality that the political 
system of Greece is not strong enough to implement these painful adjustments. Gros & Mayer 
(2010) plead for the construction of a Euro(pean) Monetary (or rather Stability) Fund that could 
allow Europe to manage a sovereign default by limiting the disruption to financial markets it 
would cause. Knowing that there is no alternative to adjustment should stiffen the resolve of the 
Greek government and soften the resistance to the kind of measures that are clearly needed. 
Postscript 
This note has concentrated on the adjustment difficulties of the countries with large (twin) 
deficits. It is clear that from the general equilibrium perspective, deficit countries can adjust 
only if surplus countries accept the corresponding counterpart: a reduction in their surpluses. 
Given that Germany has the largest surplus in Europe, many commentators have argued that the 
adjustment in Greece and the euro area periphery in general would be possible only if Germany 
stimulates its domestic demand.13  
In this context one should keep some key facts in mind: In 2009, the current account surplus of 
Germany was, as a percentage of GDP, at about 3%, lower than that of the Netherlands, 
Switzerland and Sweden. Given that the latter two economies employ floating exchange rates, it 
is immediately clear that the German surplus is due only to excessive wage moderation in 
Germany. One should also keep in mind that according to IMF data the combined surplus of the 
three smaller creditor nations (‘SWSWNL’) is now somewhat larger than that of Germany. The 
adjustment on the creditor side thus has to come certainly not only from Germany (whose 
surplus has already fallen by about €100 billion since its peak of 2007). 
The current account adjustment required for external debt sustainability is shown in Table 8 
above as a proportion of GDP because this is the appropriate point of view if one seeks to 
ascertain what is required in the deficit country. However, from a general equilibrium 
perspective, it is the absolute amount in euros that matters. Taken together for the three 
countries most in need of an external adjustment – Greece, Portugal and Spain –this would 
amount to about €80 billion, or less than 1% of the euro area’s GDP. A stronger expansion of 
domestic demand would certainly be desirable to facilitate this adjustment. But, given the orders 
of magnitude of the distribution of surpluses in Europe mentioned above, it seems far-fetched to 
argue that Germany alone is somehow responsible for the excess spending in the European 
periphery and that a country like Greece cannot return to a sustainable external position unless 
Germany fundamentally changes its approach to economic policy. 
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Annex A. Keynesian multipliers and the effect of fiscal consolidation 
To assess the cost of the fiscal adjustments in terms of output fall we compute first the fiscal 
multiplier for Greece, as well as for other euro area countries. To keep things simple we follow 
the simplest Keynesian macro model imaginable: an open economy, where exports are 
determined by foreign demand (and hence exogenous in the short run) and imports vary 
proportionally with domestic income. The impact of an exogenous change in government 
spending on GDP can then be computed as follows: 
(A1)  G
m c
Y Δ
+ −
= Δ
1
1
  
Where G is government spending, c is marginal propensity of consumption and m the marginal 
propensity to import. The pure Keynesian multiplier is thus given by 1/(1-c+m), or 1/(s+m), 
where s is the marginal propensity to save (of the private sector). In percentage terms equation 
(1) can be written as a relationship between the change in government expenditure as a 
proportion of GDP and the growth rate of GDP: 
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In this simplest of Keynesian approaches, the change in government expenditure is exogenous 
and the same multiplier would apply to any other exogenous change in expenditure, for example 
exports or investment. However, under the present circumstances it is difficult to find any major 
expenditure category that could be ‘crowded in’ indirectly as a consequence of a cut in 
government expenditure. Given that banks throughout the euro area seem still reluctant to 
extend credit, investment is likely to remain weak everywhere. Similarly, intra-area exports are 
unlikely to revive given that major changes in cost competitiveness can occur only via major 
cuts in nominal wages, which are not in the cards for the time being. 
The large drop in output indicated by the simplistic multipliers suggests that fiscal consolidation 
might be much more difficult than assumed by the official convergence programmes since the 
drop in output will also lead to lower tax revenues. If tax revenues vary with demand the 
multiplier has to be adjusted to take into account the leakage at each stage of spending includes 
not only savings and imports, but also taxes. Assuming additional revenues face a marginal tax 
rate of t the multiplier becomes:14 
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Table A1. Keynesian multipliers including tax  
Country 
Keynesian multiplier including tax: 
1/(s+m+t) 
Impact of government spending on 
deficit: (s+m)/(s+m+t) 
Greece 1.4  0.5 
Italy 0.8  0.5 
Spain 1.0  0.5 
Portugal 0.9  0.6 
Germany 0.5  0.8 
Ireland 0.9  0.7 
Note: t, the marginal tax rate, is computed as ratio of the increment in tax burden of the total economy relative 
to the increment in GDP over the period 2002-07.  
Source: AMECO. 
This multiplier is considerably lower than the one calculated above. However, in this case the 
change in the deficit that can be achieved by a cut in government spending read as follows: 
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Equation (4) suggests that the final impact on the deficit will be only a fraction of the cut in 
government expenditure. This in turn means that the ‘effort’ in terms of cutting expenditure 
might be much higher than assumed so far. 
Taking into account taxation thus suggests that the multiplier is lower, but the required cut in 
expenditure higher. These two effects just cancel out as one can see by substituting equation (4) 
back into equation (3) which confirms the original multiplier in terms of the required deficit 
reduction: 
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Accordingly, in order to achieve a reduction in the deficit of 4%, which is the Greek target for 
2010, government expenditure should be cut by, at least, 8% which is expected to reduce output 
by about 11%. ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 17 
 
Annex B. Debt sustainability  
Sustainability of public debt 
The traditional debt sustainability analysis usually concentrates on a simple question: Is the 
debt-to-GDP ratio compatible with the government’s intertemporal budget constraint? The 
answer to this question is affirmative if the present constellation of expected primary deficits, 
growth rates and interest rates can go on forever, without leading to exploding debt levels. 
Typically, standard exercises focus on the fiscal adjustment that will keep the public debt-to-
GDP ratio constant. The rationale is that if the debt-to-GDP ratio is stable, or declining, the 
intertemporal budget constraint is satisfied. A constant debt-to-GDP ratio requires that:  
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where  D P is the primary deficit compatible with a sustainable debt, Y is the GDP at current 
prices, D the general government debt, i is the ‘implicit’ interest rate (actual interests paid 
divided by the stock of debt), y is the nominal GDP growth rate, SF15 is the stock-flow 
adjustment and subscript t stands for time. The element (Dt-1/Yt)×[(it-yt)/(1+yt)] represents the 
so-called snowball effect and crucially depends of the difference between (long run, steady 
state) interest rate and growth rate. The stock-flow adjustment captures the various factors that 
influence changes in the valuation of the stock of debt (or debt assumption outside the budget). 
The latter element has become much more important in many countries as government support 
for banks resulted in large increases in public debt that is not accounted for under the normal 
(national accounts based) deficit figures. 
Hence, according to equation (4) a constant debt-to-GDP ratio implies that the primary deficit 
completely offset the snowball effect and the possible negative effect arising from valuation 
elements. 
Before the outbreak of the crisis, the Greek nominal growth rate was 7.5% and the average 
interest rate of 4%, after the crisis the projections for the nominal growth rate has fallen to 1.5% 
and, because of the increase in the risk premium, the interest rate has jumped to 6.5%. In terms 
of debt sustainability this implies that the snowball factor has moved from +3.2% to -5%. Given 
a debt- to-GDP ratio of 1.2, this means that the required fiscal adjustment (in the primary 
balance) is 1.2*(3-(-5)), i.e. just below 10% of GDP.  
Table B1 below shows the contribution of both factors (nominal growth and the interest rate) to 
the change in the snowball factor for the other countries belonging to the GIPSY club. 
The resulting snowball effect is given in Table 5 in the main text. 
While traditional debt sustainability analysis provides useful indications about how certain 
policies can affect debt dynamics and its sustainability, it embeds shortcomings that become 
particularly acute when applied to foreign debt in times of stress and thus high risk premia.  
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Table B1. Boom-bust difference in the snowball factor 
 
GDP (nominal growth 
rates)  Difference  
Nominal interest 
rate  Difference  
  2003-07  2009-11  Boom to bust  2003-07  2009-11  Boom to bust 
Ireland 7.5  -2.9  -10.4  3.9 5.9  2.0 
Greece 7.4  1.5  -5.9  4.1 6.5  2.4 
Spain 7.3  -0.6  -7.9  3.9 4  0.1 
Italy 3.5  1.1  -2.5  4.1 4.3  0.1 
Portugal 3.7  0.4 -3.3  4.0 4.8  0.8 
 
Sustainability of external debt 
As shown in Tables 2 and 3, Greece external debt is very high and one important implication of 
it is that ultimately it has to be served by a ‘transfer’ of resources to the rest of the world 
through exports (of goods and services). Accordingly the foreign debt-to-exports ratio is more 
relevant than the standard debt-to-GDP ratio to assess the external sustainability.  
Applying the traditional approach of debt sustainability to the foreign debt implies that the 
condition under which the foreign debt-to-export ratio is stable is : 
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Where  t B T  is the sustainable trade balance, ND is net external debt and e is the exports growth 
rate. Similarly to the case of government debt, the stability condition is given by the relative size 
of the interest rate with respect to the growth rate. Yet when considering external debt, another 
source of complexity emerges. A country external debt is defined as the difference between 
assets and liabilities (this is the gross debt) net of foreign investment. In time of crisis the 
interest paid by a country in time of crisis on its liabilities is larger than the one it receives on its 
holdings, with the difference being the risk premium. Accounting for this implies that the 
condition above is modified as follow:        
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Where i
rf is the risk free rate, π is the risk premium and GD the gross external debt. The 
existence of the risk premium makes external adjustment more difficult. 
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This equation shows that the (change in the) trade balance as a proportion of GDP required to 
maintain sustainability after the emergence of a risk premium is roughly proportional to the 
gross debt to export ratio times the ratio of exports to GDP. Formally the difference between the 
trade balances (as a proportion of GDP) which main external debt constant in a boom and bust 
would be given by: ADJUSTMENT DIFFICULTIES IN THE GIPSY CLUB| 19 
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Where it is assumed, as usual that (1+e) is approximately equal to one. In the case of Greece, 
the exports (goods and services) to GDP ratio is about 0.25, as shown above. The gross external 
debt to exports ratio is about 6 and the net debt to exports ratio about 3. A comparative analysis 
of the situation before and after the crisis suggests that with a combination of a risk premium of 
3% and a fall in the growth rate of export of about 4%,16 the adjustment needed in terms of 
trade balance to GDP ratio is in the order of 7.5% with respect to the previous period (see the 
cell at the intersection of the third column and the third row in the table below. 
The matrix below shows the adjustment in the trade balance (as a % of GDP) that is required by 
different combinations of the risk premium on foreign debt and the fall in the growth rate of 
exports.      
Table B2. Effect of risk premia on growth in exports 
Fall in export growth rate 
(Δet)   Adjustment in trade balance-
to-GDP: Δ(TBt/Yt)  246
1  34 . 5 6
2  4.5 6 7.5
3  67 . 5 9
Risk premium 
(π) 
4  7.5 9 10.5
 
A comparison across different columns suggests that a devaluation (or increase in 
competitiveness) can contribute substantially to reducing the required adjustment (in other 
words to improve the sustainability of the external debt) even if it does not have a large impact 
on the current account in the short run, Of course, a once-off cut in wages cannot be expected to 
lead to a sustained higher growth rate of exports. But even if the immediate impact is only a 
small step increase in exports, a cut in wages might still have an important impact on investors’ 
expectations that further cuts might be forthcoming, thus leading to a sustained higher rate in 
exports (at least until the time when external equilibrium has been restored). 
Table B3. The required external adjustment   
   Hp: Fall in export growth rate (Δet) =4% 
  
Net debt-to-
exports 
Gross debt-
to-export 
Risk 
premium 
(π) 
Adjustment in 
trade balance-
to-exports  
Export-to-
GDP 
Adjustment in trade 
balance-to-GDP: 
Δ(TBt/Yt) required 
for sustainability 
IRE 0.6 13  2.4  34  0.8  28 
PT 2.8  5.8 0.5  14  0.3  4 
SP 2.3  6.3 1.3  17  0.3  6 
IT 0.96  4  0.8  7  0.3  2 
 
                                                      
16 According to the European Commission Economic Forecast (Autumn 2009), the year on year 
percentage changes in export markets would suggest an even larger fall. The difference between the 
average 2005-07 and 2009-11 amounts to more than 8% in the case of Greece. Here we prefer to use a 
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